In the Museum of Man: Anthropology, Racial Science, and Humanism in France and Its Empire, 1850-1950

Alice L. Conklin

The Ohio State University

Draft – Please do not cite without permission
Introduction

This book explores the complex role played by two generations of French anthropologists in challenging a racial, and often, racist science in the name of the equal value of all cultures. It also charts the shifting ways in which these intellectuals came to think about the relationship between science and politics, as the world in which they lived underwent numerous brutal changes. As late as the 1930s, “scientific racism” – that is to say the biological study and ranking of the human races -- was considered a fully legitimate branch of the human sciences in France. By the late 1940s and early 1950s, certain Parisian socio-cultural anthropologists took the lead in warning the public about the political dangers of such inquiries. With the help of Alfred Métraux (Swiss-born but French-trained), the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) issued in 1950 the first condemnation by an international organization of scientific racism, making the radical claim that “race was less a biological fact than a social myth.”¹ Claude Lévi-Strauss and Michel Leiris, colleagues who had worked with Métraux, published pamphlets for UNESCO advocating the need for cultural relativism and underscoring the irrelevance of race as a determinant of civilization.²

What was the background for such unprecedented public statements? How exactly did French anthropologists think about racial and socio-cultural difference, at the highwater mark of French imperialism, on the eve of World War II? How did France’s experience of the war change them? These questions lie at the heart of this study, and the

answers take us first into the history of anthropology and social theory at the turn of the twentieth century; then deep into the interwar renewal of anthropology under the name of ethnology, in Paris and in the empire; and finally into the fate of the discipline and its practitioners under the German Occupation and in its immediate aftermath.

In the second half of the nineteenth century, scholars around the Western world aimed to found a general science of man, or “anthropology.” Armchair theorists in industrializing -- and especially colonizing -- nations compared, classified, and ranked data (physical and cultural) about “primitive” peoples and “races” believed to be at an earlier evolutionary stage of political, social, and technological development. Many thinkers insisted that members of “backwards” societies lacked the cognitive capacity of “advanced” Europeans, and that these societies would “progress” only when each member acquired the ability for abstract thought – a process that imperialism was supposed to accelerate. At the same time, “race” was understood to correlate with civilizational levels, and it was assumed that all groups followed the same upward trajectory from ape to human, just not at the same speed or with the same ultimate outcome. Hence the principal reason for anthropologists to study “primitives” was to reveal new information about the supposedly similar stone-age predecessors of their own societies.

As part of their quest for a general human science, these nineteenth-century scholars began to develop specialties within their common field of inquiry. Some concentrated on studying the physical types of humankind, for example the American Josiah Nott (1804-1873); others, such as the Englishman John Lubbock (1834-1913) and the American Frederick Ward Putnam (1839-1915), focused on identifying the stages of
evolution in human prehistory. Still others sought to discover the universal laws of cultural evolution and origins of such human traits as marriage, religion, law, language and art, along the lines of Henry Lewis Morgan (1818-1881) in the United States and E. B. Tylor (1832-1917) in Britain. In France, too, self-styled anthropologists began to develop different subfields, but they made their greatest mark internationally in racial classification. France’s most famous anthropologist in the nineteenth century was Paul Broca (1824-1880), whose pioneering methods made his school the world leader in the measurement of skull and brain capacities of different races. After his death, physical anthropology remained the dominant branch of the professional discipline in France, and Broca’s precocious attention to race helped to place the concept of fixed racial differences at the heart of French anthropological studies.

In the early decades of the twentieth century, however, French anthropology began to change in methodology, organization and orientation. In particular, a new cluster of ambitious scientists sought to renew and expand the study of human cultural diversity, at a time when British and American anthropologists were challenging earlier theories of unilinear evolution, and working their way toward the pluralistic idea that every human society was historically-rooted and environmentally-conditioned. This perspective recognized that societies develop not due to each member’s acquisition of “abstract reasoning” but rather through the interactions of all members, and their collective adaptation to different modes of subsistence. In France, these new students of the social consciously chose the name “ethnologists” to distinguish themselves from physical “anthropologists,” whom they considered too preoccupied with the racial classification of humans, past and present, and too attached to the idea of universal and
inflexible stages of evolution for races and civilizations. This same group of ethnologists also introduced a new scientific method that was gaining ground internationally: *in situ* contact with so-called primitive societies, especially those close at hand in France’s colonies, rather than armchair theorizing exclusively from ethnographies and artifacts collected by others. In 1925 the sociologist Marcel Mauss and the physical anthropologist Paul Rivet organized France’s first University training in ethnology: the Institut d’Ethnologie at the Sorbonne (University of Paris), whose funding came from taxes levied in France’s empire, which this new science was also supposed to serve. In 1938 the Institut d’Ethnologie moved into the Musée de l’Homme or Museum of Man, which Paul Rivet had directed since 1928. An energetic reformer, Rivet had transformed the museum into what critics at the time deemed the most modern of the world’s institutions devoted to the display and study of humankind’s racial and cultural diversity.

Under the combined impetus of Mauss and Rivet, a reformed science of man swiftly took shape in France, with the Musée de l’Homme and the Institut d’Ethnologie as its institutional and public home, absent any dedicated University professorships in the new discipline. Mauss’ doctoral students especially became ethnology’s pioneering foot soldiers, testing empirically in the field theories that Mauss had formulated for understanding the different lifeways of “primitive” peoples, and working collaboratively as a group to synthesize their results in order to found a genuinely new “Maussian” school. Active Socialists both, Mauss and Rivet fostered a strong sense of solidarity in their young community as well as a deep commitment to anti-racism and cultural pluralism: a lived humanism and openness to the world, in an age of intensifying racism, individualism, and rise of authoritarianism on the Right and the Left. Many of these
students worked throughout the 1930s in the Musée de l’Homme trying to modernize it, and to bring this message of tolerance to the wider public through their exhibits.

Nevertheless, their cultural relativism did not lead Mauss and Rivet to reject all racial theories, in a France still deeply embroiled in the violent and exclusionary practices of empire, and in a scientific world where the epistemological foundations of racial thought were just beginning to be challenged. Socio-cultural explanations of human diversity did not definitively triumph over a racialized conception of difference among ethnologists in the interwar years. Rivet, for example, was a physical anthropologist by training who defined ethnology as the study of languages, civilizations, and races. Yet he also saw race as malleable and therefore meaningless for determining capabilities at the level of any particular group. Here he had much in common with the American anti-racist anthropologist Franz Boas, whom Rivet knew personally and admired. Rivet’s balancing of racialist and culturalist anthropology, ironically, meant that he appeared to share some of the same slippery conceptual terrain as a group of biological determinists who resurfaced in the wake of the global Depression and the rise of the Nazis to power. The most extreme of these scientific racists among professional ethnologists in interwar France was Mauss and Rivet’s contemporary, George [sic] Montandon, whose racism dressed up in the guise of the science of man went uncriticized by socio-cultural and physical anthropologists alike, in France and abroad. Montandon would become a highly visible collaborator during the German Occupation.

Despite certain continuities with nineteenth-century racial science, the emergence of a University-based ethnology in the 1920s, 1930s and 1940s did represent a turning point in the human sciences in France institutionally and epistemologically-- but not in a
way that either historians or anthropologists have previously recognized. The experience of conducting intensive fieldwork in one of France’s colonies often relativized younger ethnologists’ understandings of race and culture. Mauss and Rivet’s students, as scientists, became detached from the very colonial state that supported them. Mauss, who did the majority of the teaching at the Institut d’Ethnologie, trained future fieldworkers to look at every society holistically and to historicize cultures, rather than to search for a universal law of cultural or biological development. Mauss also insisted that, because of the denser ties of reciprocity they fostered among their members, archaic societies were “wiser” than modern industrial and liberal ones. Armed with these insights, Mauss’ students were quick to register the shock that colonial capitalism represented for the peoples of Africa, Asia and Oceania. The most talented among them began to analyze the ravages of empire in their ethnographies and to challenge longstanding and insidious forms of racial prejudice. In their works, racial science not only disappeared, but was replaced by an alternative sociologically-grounded understanding of difference based on such innovative concepts as the gift, the person, and historical contact between all societies. For them, there were no “primitives” without history or culture, living “more simply” and “authentically” than people in the modern West.

Many of these “Maussians” then risked and lost their lives during World War II. Trained to work cooperatively and to synthesize their conclusions as a group, they were drawn to fight Fascism in part for ideological reasons (although none had followed their mentors into traditional party politics), in part because successful resistance required the skills and empathy that they had honed in their work as ethnologists. The Resistance also represented the best hope of defeating the unprecedented degree of instrumentalization of
racial science during World War II – whose atrocities in the name of science had been unthinkable before the Holocaust. The French contribution to the 1950 UNESCO statement that “race was less biological fact than social myth” was, in this sense, a public rebuke by ethnologists and physical anthropologists alike to those, including members of their own academic community, who had allowed the science of man to be harnessed to a lethal political discourse. Before 1940, many French intellectuals still accepted that “true facts” displayed in a museum would suffice to combat scientific racism; the war helped to change all that. To put it another way, the UNESCO statement offered the opportunity for a specific community of intellectuals to make a political response to racism, a problem that society had created, and that science could not resolve alone. By taking advantage of this opportunity, these scientists revealed that their idea of the proper relationship between politics and science had changed dramatically since the late nineteenth century.

At this point it may be useful to clarify certain questions of terminology, for when it comes to studying concepts as confused and as heterogeneous as those associated with “race,” there is always a danger of applying contemporary meanings to notions that were understood differently in the past. In this book, I use the term “racial science” to designate the field of inquiry that developed around the study of race in the nineteenth century, particularly by anthropologists seeking to professionalize the field. These scientists tried to sort humans neatly into racial categories in which intelligence correlated with skin color, on the basis of increasingly precise measurements of body parts, usually skulls. Racial science, in short, defined what it meant to be human in the
most rigid, harmful, and dehumanizing terms imaginable. It nevertheless conformed to
the best scientific practices of its times, at least as practiced by Broca, his school, and
their successors in the first half of the twentieth century. Although their hypotheses were
racist, in the sense that anthropologists assumed from the outset that a hierarchy of races
with different mental capacities existed, these same scholars established professional
norms for testing their hypotheses, and institutions that supported these norms (peer
review, journals, learned societies, museums, laboratories, and schools). Over time,
many of these scientists came to realize that their original hypothesis was flawed, and
although they continued to study races, they no longer ranked them, or assumed that race
correlated in any way with intelligence. They were, in short, no longer racist in the ways
their predecessors had been, or in the way that some of their successors would be again.

In contrast, I use the term “scientific racism” to designate the efforts of individual
anthropologists to publicize the findings of their science for racist political ends,
particularly in two charged moments in recent French history: at the height of the
Dreyfus Affair between 1898 and 1906, and then again in the 1930s. The distinction
between racial science and scientific racism is to some extent heuristic. Scientific racism
had roots in the racial science that developed in the nineteenth century everywhere, and
scientific racism surfaced in France in many additional contexts besides the two listed
above. But to label all racial science as scientific racism undermines any serious attempt
to explain how and why this science became politicized only at certain moments and not
at others; it also obscures the complicated ways in which anti-racist anthropologists

---

3 On the concept of normal science, see Thomas S. Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, second enlarged edition (Chicago, 1970 [1962]). The question of how the Kuhnian paradigm of scientific development fits the human sciences is unsettled; Kuhn himself developed his model with the hard sciences in mind. See Steve Fuller, *Thomas Kuhn: A Philosophical History for Our Times* (Chicago, 2000).
viewed bodies in racialized and socio-cultural ways simultaneously. To state the obvious: not all racisms (or for that matter, anti-racisms) are the same, and it is essential to examine the past range of practices mobilized by racial science (including scientific racism) -- as well as its relation to the society in which it was produced -- in order to better understand its persistence down to the present.

The use of the term “primitives” in the past to designate the object of study of socio-cultural anthropologists poses a slightly different problem. Here, I retain the scare quotes, or write “so-called primitives” to make clear that such a designation was an earlier usage that has passed from our current vocabulary (unlike the term “race” which has survived while changing in meaning). It is noteworthy that no satisfactory term has been devised to describe the various groups of people who interested ethnologists in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. A number of substitutes have come and gone in the academy and beyond: “traditional,” “simple,” “tribal,” “preindustrial,” “peoples without writing,” “peoples without machines,” “technologically simple peoples,” “indigenous,” “autochthonous,” “vanishing,” “vanished,” “native,” “premodern” -- and the list goes on. I have sought to respect the usage that seems to have become most common among specialists for different parts of the world: Amerindians for the peoples of pre-Columbian Americas, Oceanians for the peoples of the South Pacific, Africans and Asians for the peoples of those continents. Since Mauss used the word “archaic,” I use this term as well, without scare quotes, when discussing him and his school; often I resort to the qualifiers I find the least demeaning: premodern, vanishing or vanished (although given that we are talking about colonized peoples, “vanquished” would be even more accurate). The problem is not only a semantic one:
the supposedly more neutral terms that we have introduced to replace the older ones of "primitive" and "savage" continue to designate a foundational difference that our society still finds meaningful: that between the industrialized West that purportedly led the way into modernity, and those groups who ostensibly failed to follow. One aim of this book is to understand how anthropologists’ discourse contributed to constructing this demarcation in France, and is so doing to demonstrate that an earlier generation, now largely forgotten, also struggled, with a certain amount of success, to replace it with a genuinely pluralist understanding of human differences.4

In taking up the story of the struggle to turn an older French anthropological tradition into a humanist science that studied peoples for the values each society creates, rather than one that ranked them on charts or graphs relative to other races, this book joins a field of sociological and historical inquiry into the origins, institutions and ideas of the nascent human sciences, as well as into the history of the idea of the proper relationship between science and politics in modern France and its empire. The emergence of this scholarship owes much to Pierre Bourdieu’s call in the 1970s for a social history of the social sciences based on his idea of “fields” – which he defined as a particular structured space with its own criteria, rules, and hierarchies that determine

4 Here Joan Scott’s insights into the persistence of sexual difference as fundamental in modern French republicanism are pertinent. As she puts it, “Placing equality and difference in antithetical relationship has, then, a double effect. It denies the way in which difference has long figured in political notions of equality and it suggests that sameness is the only ground on which equality can be claimed. It thus puts feminists in an impossible position, for as long as we argue within the terms of discourse set up by this opposition we grant the current conservative premise that since women cannot be identical to men in all respects, they cannot expect to be equal to them. The only alternative, it seems to me, is to refuse to oppose equality to difference and insist continually on differences -- differences as the condition of individual and collective identities, differences as the constant challenge to the fixing of those identities, history as the repeated illustration of the play of differences, differences as the very meaning of equality itself. Joan W. Scott, Gender and the Politics of History (New York, revised ed. 1999), 174-175. See also idem., Only Paradoxes to Offer: French Feminists and the Rights of Man (Cambridge, MA, 1997).
entry, success, and the degree of autonomy of its competing members and the knowledge they produce. Scholars interested in the human sciences have paid increasing attention to the networks, institutions, and journals that underpin and inform scientific production and help explain how and why certain scientific ideas are formulated, and eventually overturned. Michel Foucault’s studies of how professional disciplines emerge in liberal polities, and how their forms of knowledge operate independently of any particular progenitor, have been similarly provocative and productive – although perhaps more outside of France than within. Foucault’s insights have encouraged careful historical research into particular kinds of “experts” who came to “embody” power, as well as into the institutional regimes, including museums, that organized the production of social scientific knowledge along disciplinary lines. In the wake of these and related theoretical developments, scholars of the human sciences have increasingly been placing

---


“texts” in their “political and social contexts” (to paraphrase the historian of nineteenth-century psychiatry, Jan Goldstein).  

One result of this interest in the history of the human sciences has been new attention paid to the specific contributions of anthropologists to the larger domain of racial science, in France and overseas. Thanks to such scholars as Nélia Dias, Martin Staum, Laurent Muchielli, and Claude Blanckaert, we now have a variety of rich and nuanced studies regarding the content, practices, and political implications of nineteenth-century anthropology; these works also examine how certain physical anthropologists and the Durkheimian sociologists broke with biological determinism before World War I, as part of an alternative view that human behavior is socially determined. The contributions that individual colonial administrators, missionary, travelers and explorers made to the emergence of a separate branch of socio-cultural anthropology and a modern ethnographic method in France from 1900 onward are coming into focus as well. Other works have opened up new approaches to thinking about how specialized knowledge of

---

8 Jan Goldstein, *Console and Classify: The French Psychiatric Profession in the Nineteenth Century* (Chicago, 2002 [1987]), 1. In writing about the history of primitivism in postwar France, Daniel Sherman has rightly warned about the need to avoid “a simple dichotomy between text and context, which tends to privilege or attribute explanatory value to one domain over another.” Daniel J. Sherman, *French Primitivism and the Ends of Empire* (Chicago, 2011), 7. In what follows, I nevertheless draw a fairly clear line between texts and contexts because I believe that political change in the 1930s and 1940s does, in fact, account for certain discursive shifts in the French human sciences.


human groups, whether in the form of discourses (missionary, administrative, or legal) or objects (bones and artifacts), emerged and circulated among colonies, and between colonies and metropoles between 1850 and 1950. Finally, new scholarship on definitions of national belonging under the Third Republic (1870-1940) and Vichy (1940-1944) has produced a substantial body of work on race experts who were not trained as physical anthropologists but who were deeply influenced by them.

Despite the growing number of studies on different aspects of the history of sociology and anthropology in France, the shifting intersections of ideas about race, society, and culture among professionalizing academic scientists in the first half of the twentieth century, and their relationship to the larger political, social and imperialist trends of the time, remain poorly understood. The few general histories of French

---


12 William Schneider, Gérard Noirel and Patrick Weil have explored the science and politics of the geographer Georges Mauco and the immigration specialist René Martial before and during World War II. William H. Schneider, Quality and Quantity: The Quest for Biological Regeneration in Twentieth-Century France (Cambridge, 1990); Gérard Noirel, Immigration, antisémitisme et racisme en France (Paris, 2007); Patrick Weil,“Georges Mauco, expert en immigration. Ethnoracisme pratique et antisémitisme fielleux,” in Pierre-André Taguieff, ed. L’Antisémitisme de plume 1940-1944. Études et documents (Paris, 1999), 267-276; Patrick Weil, How to be French: French Nationality in the Making since 1789, Catherine Porter transl. (Durham, 2008). In his work on the republican origins of Vichy, Noirel usefully distinguishes between “experts” located outside the university (statisticians, doctors, lawyers, physical anthropologists) and academic “savants.” He argues that throughout the life of the Third Republic and Vichy, politicians enamored of science turned to experts rather than more independent-minded university professors to draft policies designed to improve the French race. Noirel explicitly (and rightly) exonerates the savants Mauss and Rivet from direct complicity in exclusionary practices towards foreigners; but he has not studied these ethnologists in any depth, and fails to consider these academics’ close relationship to the empire. Gérard Noirel, Les origines républicaines de Vichy (Paris, 1999), esp. chap 5.

13 Philip Nord, France’s New Deal: From the Thirties to the Postwar Era (Princeton, 2010).
This neglect is beginning to change, however. Several scholars are infusing new life into the social, political, and intellectual history of French anthropology in the first half of the twentieth century. Three excellent recent biographies—those of Felipo Zerelli and Christine Laurière on Paul Rivet, and of Marcel Fournier on Marcel Mauss—along with Harry Liebersohn’s erudite study of the long genesis of Mauss’ anthropological concept of the gift have brought part of the story I wish to tell to the fore, and I draw from all of them. Another exciting vein of scholarship emerging on museums and the Other, scientific exhibits at the colonial fairs, and the intertwined worlds of interwar scientific ethnographic writing and literature. The persistence of nineteenth-century racial science into the twentieth century and its influence on political elites has also come under scrutiny. Yet a focus on particular individuals and institutions, or ideas and practices, misses how Mauss, Rivet and their colleagues and students collectively forged innovative anthropological concepts and institutions after 1900 that helped the younger generation to mobilize politically and intellectually in new ways against a resurgent misuse of science.

14 See the otherwise exemplary essay on France by Robert Parkin, in Frederick Barth et al., One Discipline, Four Ways: British, German, French, and American Anthropology (Chicago, 2005); Li-Chuan Tai, L’anthropologie française entre sciences coloniales et décolonisation (1880-1960) (Paris, 2010), and Henrika Kuklick, ed. A New History of Anthropology (Oxford, 2008). Part of the challenge is that there is no definitive list of Mauss’ students in ethnology, since he taught in many different disciplines simultaneously at a time when their content was still in flux. For a list of many of those he taught, see Fournier, Marcel Mauss, 602.


Although much more work remains to be done to bring all facets of the scientific study of humanity in modern France to light, this book represents one step in that direction, by considering together the history of physical and cultural anthropology across a century of traumatic political change and rapid imperial expansion.  

The relative lack of scholarly attention to the emergence of ethnology in France and its empire, and the role it played in the larger history of the the Third Republic and Vichy, remains all the more striking when compared with the rich tradition of writing about English- and German-language anthropology for the same period. For a long time, reconstructions of Anglo-American physical and cultural anthropology proceeded separately and teleologically. The dominant narrative was that progressive scientists who boasted a cultural understanding of human variation “won out” over physical anthropologists with pernicious essentialist and racist ideas. In this context, George W. Stocking’s work in the 1960s and 1970s that portrayed Franz Boas as a transitional figure between an older racial science and a newer cultural anthropology, was an early and crucial exception. Several scholars have since followed Stocking’s lead in providing 

---

18 As Ann Stoler already noted fifteen years ago “Histories of racisms that narrate a shift from the fixed and biological to the cultural and fluid impose a progression that poorly characterizes what racisms looked like…and therefore have little to say about what distinguishes racisms today.” I would add to this statement that it is important in the case of anthropological ideas to not move from an old teleology of progress to histories that always analyze racisms and anti-racisms separately. Two recent if very different articles are suggestive of ways to think about race and culture together. Émmanuelle Saada, “Race and Sociological Reason in the Republic. Inquiries on the Métis in the French Empire (1908-1937),” International Sociology 17: 3 (Sept. 2002), 361-391, esp. 385-386 and Michelle Brattain, “Race, Racism, and Antiracism: UNESCO and the Politics of Presenting Science to the Postwar Public,” American Historical Review 112: 5 (Dec. 2007):1386-1413.

more nuanced accounts of Boas’ career and the larger trajectory of American
anthropology, including the “retreat of scientific racism” (to borrow the title of Elazar
Barkan’s 1992 book on changing concepts of race among anthropologists, geneticists and
biologists in Britain and the United States in the critical years before and during World
War II). 20

In the case of British anthropology, the persistence of racism in the postcolonial
era has led historians and anthropologists alike since the early 1990s also to reconsider
traditional ideas about their discipline’s history, and more particularly to examine the
relationship between its growth and that of the empire. The literature on colonialism and
anthropology is now extensive, and some of the earlier assumptions about how
anthropological knowledge served empire’s racist ends are being revised.21 Although
there is no question that anthropologists used the empire to their own professional

W. Stocking’s impact on the writing of the history of English-language anthropology, by anthropologists
and historians. The multi-volume History of Anthropology series that he edited, published by the
University of Wisconsin Press starting in 1983, has become an obligatory reference for anyone working in
the larger field of the human sciences.

20 Barkan, *Retreat*. Yet even in Barkan, there is an underlying teleology which implies that racial science
disappeared for good after 1945, which is clearly not the case. Since the appearance of his book in the early
1990s, scholars have begun looking more closely at the role of anthropologists in the constructions of race
in the United States in the first place, and at the intersections between the African American civil rights
struggle, racial science and landmark lawsuits. See on this point Tracy Lang Teslow, *Anthropology and the
Science of Race in America, 1900-1960* (Cambridge, forthcoming) and Lee D. Baker, *From Savage to

21 On the relationship between colonialism and the human sciences in Great Britain, see Talal Asad,
*Anthropology and the Colonial Encounter* (New York, 1973); George W. Stocking, Jr., ed. *Colonial
Situations: Essays on the Contextualization of Ethnographic Knowledge* (Madison, 1991); Henrika
Kuklick, *The Savage Within: The Social History of British Anthropology, 1885-1945* (Cambridge, 1991);
Nicholas Dirks, ed. *Colonialism and Culture* (Ann Arbor, 1992); Jean Comaroff and John Comaroff,
*Ethnography and the Historical Imagination* (Boulder, 1992); Thomas, *Colonialism’s Culture*; Bernard
Cohn, *Colonialism and its Forms of Knowledge*, (Princeton, 1996); Peter Pels and Oscar Salemink , eds.
*Colonial Subjects. Essays on the Practical History of Anthropology* (Ann Arbor, 2000); Helen Tilley with
Robert Gordon, eds., *Ordering Africa: Anthropology, European Imperialism and the Politics of
Knowledge* (Manchester, 2007); Kapil Raj, *Relocating Modern Science: Circulation and the Construction
of Knowledge in South Asia and Europe, 1650-1900* (London, 2007); Omnia El-Shakry, *The Great Social
Laboratory: Subjects of Knowledge in Colonial and Postcolonial Egypt* (Stanford, CA, 2007) and Helen
Tilley, *Africa as a Living Laboratory: Empire, Development, and the Problem of Scientific Knowledge,
the 1930s, this colonial imbrication had unintended consequences. When it came to “selling” their respective expertise to colonial officials in the interwar years, anthropologists interested in analyzing social change were more successful than psychiatrists who sought to conduct racial intelligence testing on the local populations. In Tilley’s words “anthropologists, who had worked for so long to stake out a claim to be included among the empire’s experts” then used their tools to chip away at colonialism from within.22

While once as little studied as the French tradition, the political, cultural and social history of the German-language anthropological tradition is coming into its own, in part once again thanks to the work of George W. Stocking Jr. His interest in Boas’ German years helped to launch a new wave of scholarship on the genesis and evolution of the German tradition considered on its own terms. It is, of course, impossible here to escape the specter of 1933-1945, and one of the major questions informing much of this scholarship is whether or not German-language anthropology overall changed in direction from a liberal to a racist science between the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. This question, with its implicit or explicit engagement with the Sonderweg thesis, has produced several new studies examining nineteenth-century anthropology and its connections (or not) to colonialism.23 While the debate continues over how rooted first colonial, then Nazi scientific racism was in the anthropology of imperial Germany, there seems to be a growing consensus that in the years leading up to World War I, Germany


still boasted a liberal, anti-racist and humanitarian anthropology, side by side with a Darwinian-inflected essentialist one. By the mid-1920s, however, a new generation of biological determinists came to the fore, radicalized by events inside and outside the profession, including the deaths of the liberal “founding” fathers, defeat in the Great War and the Treaty of Versailles, and the advance of genetics. This new generation would collaborate with the Nazis.

In the face of this strong interest in English-language and German-language anthropology for the period after 1900, why has the history of the discipline in France so far been been neglected? Several factors can be cited. One has to do with the selective memory of anthropologists themselves. As suggested above, it has long been assumed that there was not much of a story to tell. Racial science, according to conventional wisdom, was an embarrassing “error,” on its way out after 1900, and socio-cultural anthropology took off immediately after World War II. From this vantage point, the years in between saw only institutional organization, not new theories or methods -- or none worth remembering. Among these new theories were certain cultural-racist ones.


25 Andrew Evans has recently shown how a younger nationalist generation of physical anthropologists carried out measurements on POWs from across Central Europe between 1914 and 1918, which helped to pave the way for a racist racial science again to become ascendant. Andrew D. Evans, Anthropology at War: World War I and the Science of Race in Germany (Chicago, 2010).
that today are as discomfiting as those of racial science. Mauss and Rivet did not, in fact, have a monopoly on thinking about culture in innovative ways. The pessimistic ideas of the nineteenth-century essayist and diplomat Joseph-Arthur (Comte de) Gobineau about the inequality and future degeneration of the races and superiority of Indo-European civilization resurfaced in altered form in the 1930s, especially in theories that ranked civilizations into hierarchies similar to those used by physical anthropologists for the human races. Like racial science, this dark side of anthropology has been more convenient to forget than address. The painful question of colonial and wartime accommodation and collaboration by anthropologists has played its part, too, in making much of the ethnological production of the fraught 1930s and 1940s seem better left alone.26

A second reason for the neglect of pre-1950 French ethnology has to do with the “unusual” way in which it was established professionally. In hindsight, ethnology appeared to lack a charismatic leader (comparable, for example, to Durkheim for sociology) who might have negotiated the discipline’s entry earlier into what is often referred as the New (or reformed) University in late nineteenth-century France.27 This absence posed a problem for a discipline habituated to constructing its memory in genealogical and patriarchal terms. From this perspective, the death of several of

---

26 This taboo is rapidly ending, as evidenced by the seminar in ethnology at the École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales in Paris, run jointly by Christine Laurière, Daniel Fabre, and André Méry. Its subject in 2010-2011 was “Questions d'histoire de l'anthropologie en Éurope (1930-1960),” and in 2011-2012, “Les ethnologues et le fait colonial (1920-1960).”

27 Paul Broca might have achieved this entry, had he not died in 1880. With the advent of the Third Republic, France’s institutions of higher learning, and especially its universities acquired greater autonomy in recruitment, areas of research, and decisions over new courses of study – hence the designation the “New” University. Specialized research and publication became more important for faculty promotion than the popularization of ideological concepts, which had been the norm earlier in the nineteenth century. George Weisz, The Emergence of Modern Universities in France, 1863-1914 (Princeton, 1983), introduction and chap. 8.
Durkheim’s most talented students in World War I marked the end of the glory years of sociology – ethnology’s “older sibling” so to speak. Durkheim’s nephew and heir, Marcel Mauss, has often been remembered “only” as a brilliant precursor, because he never completed any books. This view, however, overlooks the fact that Mauss was a superb and dedicated teacher who eschewed “leadership” in favor of guiding the collective scholarly enterprise of his students. The fact that World War II decimated the already small ranks of Mauss’s followers made their achievements seem even more marginal.

Third, in the immediate postwar decades the dominant trend among anthropologists was again toward universalizing concepts, often either structuralist or Marxist. These approaches reoriented the discipline away from the historically grounded study of individual societies in which the 1930s ethnologists had excelled, and which had taken into account the impact of colonialism as well as the instrumentalization of anthropology by colonial authorities. Fourth, the creation of University positions under Vichy and after shifted the cutting edge of the discipline from the museum to the academy, making it all the more tempting to ignore the phase of ethnology’s consolidation associated with the Institut d’Ethnologie and the Musée de l’Homme, when no University Chairs in ethnology existed in France. Finally, the crisis of confidence and the self-reflexive turn that rocked the discipline of ethnology in the 1970s over its direct and indirect “complicity” with empire and other forms of racial injustice seems – after a first burst of scholarship -- to have diverted attention away from the very history that needed to be written. 

---

28 Early works that explored the question of complicity in empire include Gerard Leclerc, *Anthropologie et colonialisme* (Paris, 1972); Jean Copans, ed. *Anthropologie et impérialisme* (Paris, 1975); Philippe Lucas
This book aims to rectify these imbalances in a variety of ways. In keeping with the most recent trends in the larger history of anthropology, it seeks to provide an analysis of texts in contexts.\textsuperscript{29} To this end, it begins with a reconsideration of nineteenth-century developments, before turning to the contested ground and bitter confrontations that the renovating science of man generated between 1900 and 1950. A second goal is to replace a comforting narrative of the inevitable triumph of good sociocultural anthropology over bad physical anthropology with a more complex story of the gradual separation of racial science and ethnology from 1900 through to the end of World War II. More benign, but also more malign, outcomes were always possible. Rather than take as my analytical lens a single institution, or individual, or set of ideas, I focus on providing a multi-generational group portrait consisting mostly of men, and on examining their writings and their lives \textit{in situ}. The material and professional structures and the changing political and imperial contexts that conditioned their intellectual output, their career options, their attempts to reach out to a larger public, and their wartime choices are especially emphasized.

The chapters that follow study the ideas, research practices, and colonial encounters of the ethnological school founded by Mauss and Rivet at the Institut d’Ethnologie more or less at the same time that Rivet acquired control of the most important ethnographic and osteological collections in Paris – collections that would in

\begin{flushleft}
and Jean-Claude Vatin, \textit{L’Algérie des anthropologues} (Paris, 1975); Pierre Bourdieu, ed. \textit{Le mal de voir: Ethnologie et orientalisme. Politique et épistémologie, critique et autocritique} (Paris, 1976); Daniel Nordman and Jean-Pierre Raison, ed. \textit{Sciences de l’homme et conquête coloniale: Constitution et usage des sciences humaines en Afrique (XIX–XXe siècles)} (Paris, 1980); Jean-Claude Vatin et al., \textit{Connaissances du Maghreb: Sciences sociales et colonisation} (Paris, 1984). For the self-reflexive turn in anthropology more generally, which began in the United States, the key work is James Clifford and George E. Marcus, eds. \textit{Writing Culture: The Poetics and Politics of Ethnography} (Berkeley, CA, 1986). \textsuperscript{29} I am using the term “text” here broadly, to include museum objects, which also have to be “read” by the historian.\end{flushleft}

22
1938 form the core of the Musée de l’Homme. The Institut d’Ethnologie and Musée de l’Homme were themselves part of a larger constellation – what the French call a nébuleuse -- of overlapping networks, people, museums and schools in France and in the colonies, all with an interest and expertise in modernizing the science of humanity on the eve of World War I. Since some of these innovators were racial and racist scientists who were accepted as legitimate interlocutors in the wider intellectual field, they too are considered. In particular, I explore the strange career of the physical anthropologist and ethnographer George Montandon, which sheds new light on the murky world of scientific racism in 1930s France. Although a marginal figure in some ways, he was part of a larger group of physical anthropologists whose professional fortunes revived in the 1930s, and whose murderous racism became scientific dogma in the new political context of Vichy and the Occupation. How this transformation became possible needs to be explained.

Last but not least, making sense of certain intellectual, institutional, and political French trends requires the evocation of a broader context still in the pages that follow: that of comparable developments in the rest of Europe and the United States, at a time when anthropologists internationally were facing many of the same professional and political choices, constraints, and opportunities to reinvent themselves as those in France, and the discipline remained itself split institutionally between the museum and the University. Until the Occupation made international communication impossible, French ethnologists were cosmopolitans who paid close attention to what was happening in German, Soviet, American, British and Scandinavian socio-cultural and physical anthropology: they read their publications, visited their museums, and met each other in
conferences. In the interwar era, many human scientists in these countries lobbied their
governments to recognize the practical implications of their science for governance, and
experimented with new ways to popularize their findings. Mauss was simultaneously
admiring and critical of the towering “pioneer” of modern solo fieldwork, the Polish-born
British anthropologist Bronislaw Malinowski, whose works all his students had to read.
And Mauss and Rivet regularly evoked “foreign” examples to try to squeeze more
resources for their fledgling science out of a parsimonious state, financially strapped
colonies, and a University system hostile to innovation. France, they argued, had once
been a leader in this particular domain of the human sciences, but now had fallen way
behind.

This insistence that France was a laggard, that “France was different,” has to be
taken with a grain of salt. It is more accurate to see French ethnologists between 1900
and 1950 as full partners in an international science that was itself in flux, and then under
siege everywhere, as war swept the globe for a second time. Certainly anthropology,
physical and socio-cultural, entered the University in France later than in its closest
international rivals. Yet before and during World War II, ethnologists had considerable
success in obtaining positions and appropriating funds and artifacts from the colonies for
themselves. From the point of view of the development of new methods and new
theories, French ethnologists and racial scientists made distinctive contributions,
especially in terms of a Maussian sociological ethnography, but also in the revival of a
biological determinism that essentialized the nation in racist terms. During the war years
George Montandon, much like several of his counterparts across the Rhine, actively
collaborated with the Nazis. In all these ways, French ethnology shared key features of
the better-known cases of Anglo-American and German anthropology, while also retaining characteristics peculiar to its own time and place. This study therefore highlights the importance that underlying institutional and material structures and networks played and continue to play in the academic life of France, as well as the dangerous power of ideology to distort the most human of the human sciences.

In order to chart this complex history of ethnology, the chapters are ordered chronologically and thematically. Chapter One analyses the two major traditions – Paul Broca’s physical anthropology and a more fragmented science of ethnography – that professionalized in the early Third Republic. Chapter Two follows the careers of Paul Rivet, Marcel Mauss and George Montandon in the period from the Dreyfus Affair to the establishment of the Institut d’Ethnologie in the late 1920s. Chapters Three, Four and Five examine the newly organized discipline of ethnology from three different vantage points (the museum, racial science, and the empire) during the politically polarized 1930s. This was a period of dramatic growth but also perils for the renovated science of man, as ethnologists struggled to articulate, for themselves and a broad public, a new concept of the human that remained entangled with biological notions of difference and the imperial cause. Chapter Six provides a close reading of the field-based ethnographies produced by Mauss’ students, to highlight the combined power of a brilliant mentor and contact with colonial realities to challenge the resurgent scientific racism of the era. Chapter Seven analyzes the wartime choices of an intellectual community whose science suddenly mattered, or was thought to matter, to new political actors: Vichy, the Resistance, and the Germans occupying France. The conclusion takes up the question of
the UNESCO race statement, its political significance, and the involvement of French scientists in its drafting.

Historians of anthropology everywhere have tended to read backwards into their profession a foundational division of the racial and physical from the cultural. This division did ultimately occur, but not easily; and what anthropologists learned to separate with difficulty, a wider public has often not grasped at all. Given the importance today of scientific expertise in legitimating competing truth claims about race and culture, a better understanding of anthropologists’ earlier attempts to explain social phenomena culturally without necessarily questioning the reality of race is in order. As Tracy Teslow has argued in the case of American anthropology, “recapturing the fullest possible picture of how science and scientists functioned within society serves an epistemological and historical purpose in counter-acting the powerful ideological and rhetorical force of science itself.”

As in the interwar and Vichy years, contradictions continue to mark racial formation and cultural identity in France. The “discredited” assumptions of nineteenth-century racial science seem to resurface regularly in popular and elite discourse, no matter what scientists may say on the question. The assertion that “not all civilizations

30 In the United States, recent pronouncements by scientists correlating intelligence with race or gender offers ample testimony that the notion that “science” can tell the “truth” about the “innate” capacities of different human groups is still deeply entrenched. See, for example, Richard J. Herrnstein and Charles A. Murray, The Bell Curve: Intelligence and Class Structure in American Life (New York, 1994) and Lawrence Summers’ 2005 remarks while President of Harvard, http://www.pbs.org/newshour/updates/science/jan-june05/summersremarks_2-22.html. For a superb historical analysis of the persistence of racism and its constant reinvention, see Thomas C. Holt, The Problem of Race in the Twenty-First Century (Cambridge, MA, 2000).
31 Teslow, Anthropology, Introduction.
are of equal value,” by the French Minister of the Interior Claude Guéant in a public speech on February 4, 2012, reveals the ease with which the discredited -- but once “scientifically proven” -- notion of a “natural” hierarchy of peoples, races, and cultures still informs contemporary political debates. All too often, and not only in France, the concept of “civilization” or “culture” remains a code word for the older concept of “race” in which an underlying biological understanding of difference is implicit. Such confluences are deeply depressing, but they are neither new nor do they have to be permanent. As Andrew Zimmerman reminds us, anthropology since its birth has always had “multivalent and contradictory potentials:” to essentialize but also to democratize, to objectify the other but also to empathize. In this longer perspective, the period from 1900 to 1950 represented a moment of intensifying mobilization – scientific and then political -- against racism; and in this mobilization, French anthropologists’ knowledge and actions played a crucial role.

33 Zimmerman, Anthropology, 11.