In 1959 American director King Vidor’s 1956 adaptation of War and Peace, starring Henry Fonda, Audrey Hepburn (a favorite with Soviet audiences), and Mel Ferrer, was released in the USSR. It was one of a wave of American films imported following a US-Soviet cultural exchange agreement in 1958. Although some Soviet critics have claimed that the film was not well received by Soviet audiences, 31.4 million spectators bought tickets, putting it in second place for foreign films and tenth place overall, belying those claims.¹ Surprisingly, it was the only adaptation of Tolstoy’s masterwork in the past forty-one years.

Genesis

After the release of Vidor’s film in the Soviet Union, sentiments began to grow that it needed to be “answered” with a bigger and better epic.² In the opinion of Russian film scholar Fyodor Razzakov, Vidor’s War and Peace was a weapon in the Cold War, intended to show that the United States was richer than the USSR.³ These rumblings increased in 1961 as the 150th anniversary of Napoleon’s invasion approached and plans
were made to open the Museum-Panorama “Battle of Borodino” on Kutuzov Avenue in Moscow.4

There can be little doubt, however, that the primary impetus for a Soviet War and Peace was the cultural Cold War.5 Some Soviet citizens were outraged that “their” masterpiece had been appropriated by the Americans, who presented merely a facsimile of Russian culture. In February 1961 the Central Committee of the Communist Party received a letter from scientists, cultural figures, and military officers complaining that an “American” War and Peace had appeared on Russian screens.6 Shortly thereafter a group of leading cinematographers also wrote a letter demanding a Soviet War and Peace, stating: “As is well known, the American film, based on this novel, communicated neither the artistic nor the national aspects of Tolstoy’s epic, nor the great, liberating spirit of the Russian people.”7 Bondarchuk himself wrote letters to friends and colleagues: “Why is it that this novel, the pride of Russian national character, was adapted in America and released in their cinema halls? And we ourselves are not able to adapt it? It’s a disgrace to the entire world!”8 The Central Committee took these complaints seriously and turned the project over to the minister of culture, Yekaterina Furtseva. The film was going to be a goszakaz, a state ordered picture that guaranteed good distribution and lots of prestige.9

Many directors vied for this important assignment, chief among them Ivan Pyrev, formerly the head of Mosfilm. As Kristin Roth-Ey notes: “Bringing a movie to the screen in the USSR always entailed an intricate choreography of institutional relationships,” and Pyrev had enemies among the Khrushchev-era reformers in the Kremlin.10 Furtseva was loath to appoint him as sole director.11 In their letter, the cinematographers had suggested
Bondarchuk as director: “We must attract the best dramaturges and masters of cinema to work on it. The production of the film should be led by one of our best film directors. The most worthy candidate for us seems to be the laureate of the Lenin Prize, People’s Artist of the USSR, S. F. Bondarchuk.” Bondarchuk reluctantly accepted Furtseva’s offer. Initially, Bondarchuk and Pyrev were supposed to codirect, but Pyrev abruptly left the project after a failed love affair with Liudmila Maichenko, an actress being considered for the part of Natasha. That left Bondarchuk—unlike Pyrev, a non-Communist—to direct the film.

Despite the opinion of the Soviet cinematographers, Sergei Bondarchuk was not an obvious choice to direct such a politically important film. Indeed, he recalled that his first response was fear; he consulted with writer Mikhail Sholokhov, the world-famous author of Quiet Flows the Don (Tikhii Don), as to whether he should take on the task. After all, he had directed just one prior film, the touching psychological drama The Fate of a Man (Sudba cheloveka, 1959, based on a Sholokhov story), about the travails of a Soviet prisoner of war in World War II. Granted, The Fate of a Man had been a major hit, but it was an intimate picture, about as far from an epic as any film could be.

Two years later, he found himself at the helm of what would become the most expensive film made to date and perhaps the most expensive film of all time. Estimates of War and Peace’s costs range from a low of $29 million to a high of $100 million, the equivalent of about $700 million today. The true costs of the film will never be known because of the unprecedented level of “free” state support it received. For example, many Russian commentators have cited the Guinness Book of Records’ claim that there were 120,000 extras in the film who were provided “practically free” by Mosfilm.
it was “one of only a few Soviet films shot in 70mm format.” When the first of its four parts, “Andrei Bolkonsky,” was released, 2,805 copies were made (a record for Soviet cinema) for an audience of 58.3 million. The film was eventually shown in at least eighty countries and was seen by 250 million viewers worldwide. Even Tolstoy’s daughter Alexandra liked it. As film scholar Elena Prokhorova writes: “In short, *War and Peace* was designed as a Soviet prestige object, demonstrating the superiority of Soviet cinema.” “We had to compete with America,” recalled the film’s composer, Viacheslav Ovchinnikov.

**Production**

The storied production history of *War and Peace* demonstrates the unparalled commitment of the state to completing the project. It is fitting that this epic film, intended to smite American dominance in cinema, had an epic production that went on for more than six years. Bondarchuk’s *War and Peace* got the green light on 5 May 1961, when Minister of Culture Yekaterina Furtseva gave Bondarchuk 30,000 rubles—one-fifth of what he had asked for—in seed money. Work on the script began immediately, with Bondarchuk and writer Vasily Solovev serving as coscenarists. Initially the film was approved for three parts; the writers received 4,000 rubles for the first part and 30 percent less for each succeeding part. Some filmmakers advised Bondarchuk to go back to the historical sources for 1812 and write a “fresh” screenplay, but he was deeply committed to Tolstoy’s text, as the finished film shows. Nevertheless, Bondarchuk “scrupulously” researched his subject. The two scenarists, who worked together harmoniously, wrote what was essentially a shooting script (Solovev recalls that the film could have been
edited from it). It read, however, like a novel, at least in the opinion of literary scholar Evelina Zaidenshnur, who evaluated the script for the Ministry of Culture. Historians and Tolstoy specialists gave it good reviews as well. The film had expanded to four parts by the time Mosfilm approved the thoroughly reworked script on 27 February 1962; a little less than a month later, on 20 March 1962, the Ministry of Culture endorsed the making of the film as presented.

There had been much debate. Should the film be shot in color? Should French be spoken in the film (as it was in the novel)? Should the skirmish at Schöngraben prior to the Battle of Austerlitz be excised? Furtseva remained personally involved in the first two years of the production, which was generally a positive thing. On 26 March 1962, for example, she sent a letter to the assistant minister of agriculture requisitioning 900 horses for the production, and on 30 March she allocated nearly 1.4 million rubles to *War and Peace*—795,000 to cover the audition phase, and 600,000 for miscellaneous expenses.

The auditions for the 300 speaking parts were arduous; thousands of actors read for Bondarchuk. Even when he made a casting decision, there was trouble, despite the fact that this was a prestige film. His first choice for Prince Andrei, Oleg Strizhanov, backed out to accept a part at the Moscow Art Theater. A furious Bondarchuk pleaded with Goskino, the state film administration, to force Strizhanov to return. He then turned to Furtseva, who called Strizhanov at home and even met with him personally, to no avail. In the face of this defeat, Bondarchuk cast the extremely popular and gifted Innokenty Smokhtunovsky as Andrei, even though the actor wanted to play Pierre Bezukhov (a role Bondarchuk had taken for himself, to Smokhtunovsky’s disgust). However, director Grigory Kozintsev interfered and persuaded Smokhtunovsky to play...
the coveted title role in his own current film, *Hamlet*. After much wrangling with Kozintsev, Bondarchuk gave in, supposedly out of respect for the older generation, at least according to Solovev. More realistically, it was probably because Kozintsev had highly placed friends on the Cinema Committee. Bondarchuk told Vasily Lanovoi that if he tried out for the part of Anatole Kuragin (even though Vadim Medvedev had already been cast), he could also try out for Andrei—a role Lanovoi was anxious to play. Then Bondarchuk crassly broke his word, telling Lanovoi in a telephone call that he could be Anatole or nothing. The actor took the part.

With great reluctance, and at the insistence of Furtseva, Bondarchuk eventually cast his fellow student at VGIK, Viacheslav Tikhonov, as Andrei. In addition to being in the same class at VGIK, Bondarchuk and Tikhonov had acted together in two films: Sergei Gerasimov’s *The Young Guard* and Leonid Lukov’s *It’s Impossible to Forget This* (*Ob etom zabyvat nelzia*, 1953). Tikhonov had dreamed of playing Andrei, but he had given up hope when Bondarchuk failed to call him for a tryout. For his eventual audition, Tikhonov (as Andrei) played opposite Bondarchuk (as Pierre Bezukhov, an act of self-casting that aroused some mockery) in a scene central to Andrei’s internal evolution: the discussion of Good and Evil. Although Bondarchuk accepted Tikhonov for this key role, he truly believed that a man “with worker’s hands” who had once worked as a mechanic could not play the role of a prince. Tikhonov joined the cast on 14 December 1962, three months after shooting started, when his commitment to *Optimistic Tragedy* ended. Bondarchuk’s hostility to and bullying of Tikhonov almost led to disaster, as Tikhonov was driven into a deep depression and frequently threatened to quit the film.
Despite the difficulties of finding an actor to play Andrei, the hardest part to cast was undoubtedly Natasha. Bondarchuk initially considered dozens of established professional actresses, the top contenders being Anastasiya Vertinskaya, Natalya Kustinskaya, and Natalya Fateeva. When he decided to seek a fresh face, he called on the public to help him find his Natasha and received thousands of photographs of young women. Finally, he settled on Liudmila Saveleva, an unknown, nineteen-year-old ballerina who had just graduated from the Leningrad Choreography School. Saveleva had been accepted by the Kirov Ballet as a soloist when Bondarchuk’s associate, Tatiana Likhacheva, discovered her.

Likhacheva had a hard time selling Saveleva to Bondarchuk, who had little respect for the acting abilities of ballerinas. But when Likhacheva showed him Saveleva’s screen test for another movie, Bondarchuk reluctantly agreed to invite her for a tryout. Saveleva herself was uncertain whether she wanted the role, which she felt Audrey Hepburn “owned.” Bondarchuk was not impressed with Saveleva at first glance and thought she did not resemble Natasha at all, but when she played the marriage proposal scene with Smokhtunovsky as Andrei, Bondarchuk and the crew proclaimed with one voice, “There she is!” She was a young woman the audience would “know and love . . . as Natasha.” Bondarchuk chose her because “she was like a clean white sheet of paper.”

Difficulties with actors were only one part of the production story. Bondarchuk also had a serious problem holding on to his cinematographers. Vladimir Monakhov, the first director of photography, abruptly left War and Peace to work on Samsonov’s Optimistic Tragedy. After this defection, Bondarchuk persuaded the husband-and-wife
team of Aleksander Shelenkov and Iolanda Chen (Chen YuLan), famous for filming Zoya (Zoia, Leo Arnshtam, 1944), Admiral Ushakov (Vsevolod Pudovkin, 1953), and The Communist (Kommunist, Yuly Raizman, 1958), to be his cinematographers.\textsuperscript{55} Trouble began almost immediately: Shelenkov and Chen were shooting thirty to forty takes of each scene, an inordinate number.\textsuperscript{56} The couple exited the film on 20 May 1963 in the midst of a mini-scandal. They wrote a letter to the general director of Mosfilm, Vladimir Surin, stating that their initial joy while working on War and Peace had quickly vanished. They accused Bondarchuk of running the production like a dictator; he failed to form a creative collective, refused to work collaboratively, and reshot material without their permission. In sum, they claimed it was impossible to work with him. Surin tried, unsuccessfully, to resolve the problem but ended up accepting their resignations.

Shelenkov and Chen were replaced by thirty-one-year-old Anatoly Petritsky, the second cameraman, who had shot only one film independently, My Younger Brother (Moi mladshii brat, Aleksandr Zarkhi, 1962).\textsuperscript{57}

Petritsky`s promotion was a stroke of much-needed good luck for War and Peace, as he proved to be not only extremely talented but also innovative. Petritsky had served for five years as an assistant cameraman and was eager to work on his own, so he had been reluctant to take another job as second camera, but Surin himself had offered him the job—an unusual step. Petritsky was well aware of the turmoil on the set. In addition to the first cinematographer, Monakhov, set designer Yevgeny Kumanov had resigned as well. By 1963, Petritsky had also left the picture, returning to Moscow to work with Ivan Pyrev on a movie project. Pyrev, who was probably jealous of Bondarchuk, urged Petritsky not to return to War and Peace. In March 1963, however, Surin urgently called
him back, saying that Shelenkov was “ill” (an apparently frequent occurrence). Petritsky thought the difficulties between Shelenkov and Bondarchuk were a matter of generational conflict and that Shelenkov’s “illnesses” were symptomatic of the larger problem. Even so, Bondarchuk was reluctant to accept Petritsky as director of cinematography after Shelenkov and Chen departed and insisted that he share the duties with another cinematographer such as Gherman Lavrov or Vadim Yusov. Petritsky steadfastly refused, and pressure from Surin convinced Bondarchuk to give in and allow Petritsky to be the sole director of cinematography.58 However, relations between the two continued to be uneasy. After the tour de force scene of Natasha’s ball, Petritsky tried to quit, thinking that Bondarchuk wanted him out. But Surin told Petritsky that if he insisted on quitting, he would never work again.59 Bondarchuk recalled that Petritsky was inordinately sensitive, probably because he was not a war veteran.60 Many years later, Petritsky admitted that he had perhaps been too egotistical as a young man.61

Finally, there were problems with Bondarchuk’s choice for the film’s composer, twenty-five-year-old Viacheslav Ovchinnikov.62 Mosfilm’s Artistic Council, the studio’s censorship body, expressed grave doubts about his youth. Some Ministry of Culture bureaucrats did not want him because he was still a student, but Furtseva was in his corner.63 Ovchinnikov immodestly argued that the Russian writer Mikhail Lermontov and Wolfgang Amadeus Mozart had accomplished great things at a young age.64 Eventually, of course, Furtseva and Bondarchuk prevailed.65

Then there was the matter of the military history consultants to contend with. Here again, the state’s commitment is evident. Minister of Defense Rodion Malinovsky ordered the General Staff to open its archives to the production, and he appointed as chief
historical consultants General of the Army V. V. Kurasov and Major General P. A. Zhilin. Kurasov, director of the War Academy of the General Staff and a Hero of the Soviet Union, was in charge. As a sign of the Ministry of Defense’s wholehearted support of the project, other high-ranking generals were also appointed as consultants. General of the Army Markian Markovich, twice a Hero of the Soviet Union and known as a lover of Russian literature, became the consultant on general military affairs. Lieutenant General and Hero of the Soviet Union Nikolai Oslikovsky, an economist by training and a former film producer, became the consultant on cavalry operations. Marshal Vasily Chuikov, famous for the defense of Stalingrad, attempted to intervene in the production and objected to the formation of cavalry units for the film; Furtseva had to smooth things over. And when the editing of the battle scenes was finished in December 1963, they were shown to the highest-ranking officers in the military for approval, including seventeen marshals, with colonel general the lowest rank in the entourage.

As if having to please the generals were not enough, the film also had to pass muster with the political watchdogs at Mosfilm. These critics found the script’s depiction of Pierre and his wife Hélène to be “somewhat banal history” compared with the battle scenes, and they called for better development of Natasha’s brother, Nikolai Rostov, and the relationship between Prince Andrei and Captain Tushin. There was also wrangling over how many parts the film would be divided into; Bondarchuk and Furtseva wanted two long parts, but others argued that three or four would be better for distribution.

Then there was the task of gathering objects for the film. Bondarchuk was absolutely committed to historical verisimilitude, and he even called in a hairdresser from Paris to coif the cast for Natasha’s ball. Furtseva ordered the cooperation of all the
historical museums and archives in the Soviet Union; all told, fifty-eight museums, ranging from the Armory of the Kremlin Museum and the Military-Historical Museum to the Tretiakov Gallery and the Tolstoy Museum, provided furniture, paintings, dishware and cutlery, decorative objects, sabers, rifles, and so on. Production manager Nikolai Ivanov recalled that the film could not have succeeded without the help of the directors and staffs of the museums. In addition, thousands of ordinary citizens sent personal period items for use in the film. Irina Skobtseva, who played Pierre’s wife Hélène and was Bondarchuk’s real-life wife, remembered that all the jewelry in the film had been donated.

What could not be found had to be constructed. The crew built 272 sets and fabricated “100 historically accurate artillery pieces “ and 60 wooden cannons that looked like the real thing. Sabers were made from “undisclosed lightweight material to avoid injury” in the hand-to-hand combat scenes. Costumes were copied from period textiles and included 9,000 soldiers’ uniforms and 3,000 civilian costumes.

Finding animals for the film was an even more difficult problem. As noted earlier, Furtseva had already requisitioned 900 horses from the Ministry of Agriculture, but at least 600 more would be needed to accommodate the 1,500 soldiers acting as cavalry in the Battle of Borodino. Bondarchuk asked private owners for help, as well as circuses and slaughterhouses. They also needed dogs: sixty beagles and thirty borzois for the hunt scene. The borzois—a quintessential Russian breed that had once been a symbol of the aristocracy—were all donated to the production after a public appeal.

Meanwhile, a small creative group traveled to Transcarpathia in western Ukraine in April 1962 to prepare for shooting, which began symbolically on 7 September 1962,
the 150th anniversary of the Battle of Borodino.\textsuperscript{81} Shelenkov and Chen required numerous takes which drove costs up. In addition to the number of takes demanded by Shelenkov and Chen, even after extensive rehearsals, the poor quality of the Soviet-made 70mm film necessitated extra takes due to breakage.\textsuperscript{82} Bondarchuk had wanted to use Eastman-Color, but for reasons of cost (and national pride), DS-5 and LN-5 film from the Shostinsky factory was employed.\textsuperscript{83} Cinematographer Petritsky recalled that there were mosquitoes in the emulsion, and often the film perforations did not match up.\textsuperscript{84} There were also difficulties with the Soviet-made 70mm cameras, especially with the fade and superimposition. Petritsky mused many years later: “The Americans could do it. Why couldn’t we?”\textsuperscript{85} The quality of the film stock, however, was the “scourge” of the production.\textsuperscript{86}

There were numerous delays between September 1962 and August 1963, including many breaks for harsh winter weather. Preparation for shooting the Battle of Borodino began on 1 August 1963, and the main part of the filming took place over six weeks in September and October.\textsuperscript{87} Hundreds of meters of rail had to be laid for the dollies used by the remote-control cameras.\textsuperscript{88} A fifteen-meter-high tower was built on a rolling platform with cables for the camera, along with a “suspension road” for aerial shots.\textsuperscript{89} The extras consisted of 13,500 infantrymen and 1,500 cavalrymen, all drawn from the Soviet army. The special effects were spectacular: 23 tons of explosives, 40,000 liters of kerosene, 12,000 aerial explosives, 10,000 smoke grenades. But the production did not rely entirely on modern effects; 1,500 antique weapons from Soviet museums were employed in the scene.\textsuperscript{90} Amazingly, there were no injuries to the cast or crew, but some horses were hurt during the re-creation of the battle.\textsuperscript{91}
Production continued mainly at the Mosfilm studio through 1964. Filming of the next important scene, Natasha’s ball, began on 28 March 1964. Bondarchuk had originally hoped to use the large foyer of the Tauride Palace in Leningrad, but the electricity there was too unreliable for filming. They had to settle for a set built on Mosfilm’s stage 1—the largest pavilion, at 1,400 square meters. A large space was needed to accommodate the more than 500 dancers that appear in the scene. According to Petritsky, the scene was filmed by four cameramen on roller skates using handheld cameras, but it was plagued by the exceptionally hot lighting system in the pavilion (the high temperatures melted the actors’ makeup) and the low quality of the film stock. Nevertheless, the scene is outstanding for its cinematography and its choreography.

In mid-June 1964 Bondarchuk traveled to Tolstoy’s ancestral home, Yasnaya Polyana, to restore his flagging energies. He returned to Moscow in early July, and on 23 July 1964 the production was struck with a terrible blow. While watching a screening of Mikhail Kalatozov’s new film *I Am Cuba (Ia Cuba)*, Bondarchuk suffered a major heart attack. He was clinically dead for a few minutes, and doctors worked for more than two hours to stabilize him. He was out of commission until 27 September.

By 1965, the Ministry of Culture was getting anxious about the slow pace of production. The film had cost 8,165,200 rubles to date, not counting all the “free” support offered by various agencies of the government. The decision was made on 26 May 1965, against Bondarchuk’s wishes, to send the first two parts to the IV Moscow International Film Festival, even though the film was unfinished. This decision forced the rapid editing of parts one (“Andrei Bolkonsky”) and two (“Natasha Rostova”). The hard and hurried
work paid off, because *War and Peace* shared the grand prize with a Hungarian film, Zóltan Fábri’s *Twenty Hours* (*Húsz óra*, 1965).  

The first half of *War and Peace* was released to the general public in 1966, as shooting continued. The line at the Rossiya Theater, Moscow’s largest, was a kilometer long.  

The head of Goskino, Aleksei Romanov, recalled that “the first part was seen by 49 million people in only five months, although . . . our film *War and Peace* did not have a single advertisement.” Oddly enough, this is true, but it did have a significant amount of preproduction and production publicity in the mass fan magazine *Soviet Screen* and even in the serious film journal *Cinema Art*.

Shooting of the final scenes, including the magnificent Moscow fire episode, took place near the village of Teryaevo in Volokolamsk oblast. An extraordinary stand-in for old Moscow was constructed. The set crew had begun planning in late December 1965, but the building did not commence until 25 July 1966. The crew also built tracks for the camera dollies. At 2:30 p.m. on 6 October 1966, the burning of Moscow was filmed with six cameras (the cameramen wore flame-retardant clothing) and five fire engines, under the supervision of the production’s pyrotechnics specialist V. A. Likhachev. Petritsky feared that his cameras and film stock might melt, but fortunately, the scene proceeded smoothly, using SU and MIG-9 planes and helicopters for the aerial scenes. There could be no second takes. On 25 October filming was complete, four long years after it had begun. All that remained to be done was sound, music, and editing, as well as the six-month-long process of organizing the return of all the objects loaned by the various museums.
On 28 December 1966 Mosfilm approved the finished part three (“1812”), as work on part four (“Pierre Bezukhov”) continued. Four months later, on 26 April 1967, part three was screened at the Cannes Film Festival, outside the competition. This showing—standing room only—was a “fantastic success.” The film was distributed to France, Japan, England, and Belgium before it was shown to the Soviet public. But when part three premiered at the Rossiya Theater on 21 July, the audience, perhaps tired of all the hype since its win at the Moscow International Film Festival, or perhaps disenchanted with its serious subject, stayed away. Only 21 million people saw part three, a decline of 37 million. This was a real shame, since the Battle of Borodino is one of the best battle scenes ever filmed. Part four premiered on 4 November 1967 to even fewer spectators—only 19.8 million. Perhaps Bondarchuk and Furtseva had been right: the film should have been shown in two parts. Nevertheless, War and Peace was among the Soviet blockbusters of the 1960s and recouped its billed, as opposed to actual, costs. Parts one and two ranked twenty-sixth and twenty-seventh as all-time Soviet box-office hits. As the current head of Mosfilm, director Karen Shakhnazarov, observes: “Everybody wanted to see it,” even though the response was mixed.

Because the film was conceived as a weapon in the Cold War and because Soviets tended to compare their culture to the Americans’, of special pride to the cast and crew was the Academy Award for Best Foreign Language Picture of 1968, presented in April 1969. Only Saveleva attended the ceremony, ironically sitting next to King Vidor, who was gracious and praised the film lavishly. It also won prizes at the Venice International Film Festival and from the New York Association of Film Critics. As a
whole, the cast was very proud of the film, and Saveleva hyperbolically called it a “gift to the Motherland like Tretiakov’s gift of the gallery.”

Virtually everyone involved in War and Peace regarded their participation as an endurance test. The chief reason was Sergei Bondarchuk, a workaholic who “lived in the studio.” Some of them were awestruck, considering him to be an “actor’s director.” Even Saveleva, who was intimidated by Bondarchuk and called him an “absolute commander,” admired his efforts, like “the last of the Mohicans,” to preserve Russian culture.

These positive recollections are contradicted, however, by the memories of others who describe a very different Bondarchuk, an overweening authoritarian, who was, perhaps, stressed by the enormous weight of his charge. The difficulty he had keeping cinematographers is a case in point; even his ultimate choice, Petritsky, had an on again–off again relationship with him. Antonina Shuranova, who played Princess Marya, described him as a “dictator” who made his actors, including her, very nervous on the set; she even lost her voice during the first take of her first scene, when Andrei is going off to war. Bondarchuk himself wrote: “The director has studied all the material for the film; he alone knows everything. He is tsar and god.”

Definitely worst was Bondarchuk’s treatment of Tikhonov. Trofimov reported that Tikhonov was forced to perform take after take. The scene where Prince Andrei defends Captain Tushin before General Bagration was reshot twenty-nine times. Shuranova recalled that Tikhonov was even more nervous than she was. Tikhonov believed that Bondarchuk’s animus was caused by his belief that an actor from a working-class family could not play a prince. Tikhonov began to doubt himself, and after
Bondarchuk repeatedly complained about the actor’s large hands, he wore white gloves in an effort to conceal them. Bondarchuk’s words—“Bolkonsky is completely different”—kept ringing in his ears, and he asked to be released from the film more than once.

After the screening of the first two parts of War and Peace for the cast and crew at the Udarnik Theater, Bondarchuk praised everyone, especially Saveleva. To Tikhonov, he simply said, “You won the marathon.” In the end, Tikhonov faced a severe emotional crisis: “I didn’t believe in myself.” He felt that his “individuality had been squashed out of him” and thought he should quit acting. Nevertheless, the role was real career booster for Tikhonov. Despite the critical ambivalence about Tikhonov’s Andrei, Soviet Screen’s 1966 readers’ poll chose Tikhonov and Saveleva as best actors for their performances in part one.

Reception

Given that Bondarchuk’s picture was intended to showcase Soviet cinematic power, the reception of the film domestically and internationally is especially important. In a 1967 postmortem, part of the discussion centered on the paucity of reviews of the film; there were allegedly only four reviews about part one (there were actually a few more, depending on what one counts as a review). Goskino head Aleksei Romanov complained: “This isn’t a lot, especially since there were nearly 7,000 articles published abroad about it.” As Russian film scholar Natalia Tendora put it: “Only in Russia was the success of the picture, as always, silenced.” According to Tendora, Bondarchuk’s
unpopularity with film critics and other filmmakers was one reason for this relative silence.\textsuperscript{134}

The film’s reception in the USSR was definitely mixed; given the status of Tolstoy’s novel and the film’s monumental sweep, it could hardly be otherwise.\textsuperscript{135} Most critics found both good and bad in the film. As historian Stephen Norris notes: “Early reviews believed that Bondarchuk had for the most part captured the spirit of the times. They divided over whether or not he had captured Tolstoy’s spirit.”\textsuperscript{136} The journal \textit{Soviet Culture (Sovetska kultura)} was perhaps the most enthusiastic, calling the film a “big, exciting work . . . a national work, lofty . . . mighty, deep, Russian.”\textsuperscript{137} K. Zamoshkin also saw the film as very Russian and very patriotic; it was “big, serious, deep, innovative.”\textsuperscript{138} Although critic A. Sofronov, writing in \textit{The Light (Ogonek)}, called the film a “talented reproduction” rather than a true screen adaptation, he still praised it as an “achievement,” especially the cinematography, the performances of actors Liudmila Saveleva and Anatoly Ktorov, and the film’s “patriotism and authenticity.”\textsuperscript{139} Director Khamil Yarmatov was especially sympathetic, noting the amount of work that had gone into the production. He cited Bondarchuk’s success in creating an “indelible spectacle” and wrote: “Without a doubt, the picture \textit{War and Peace} is not only a great event in our cinematography but one of the most successful adaptations of a Russian classic.”\textsuperscript{140}

It seemed that everyone could agree on a few points. First, the battle scenes were magnificent.\textsuperscript{141} Second, two of the cast members were outstanding: Anatoly Ktorov and Liudmila Saveleva. The casting of Ktorov as Prince Nikolai Bolkonsky was indeed a masterstroke. Ktorov, a major film star in the 1920s, had not acted in film in thirty years and had been working exclusively at the fabled Moscow Art Theater. He managed to
achieve a purely Tolstoyan image of the old prince, who found happiness in endless activity.\textsuperscript{142} There was also general agreement that Saveleva was the perfect Natasha. No one, however, could outdo Bondarchuk in his praise. The “very Russian, very national” Saveleva, he declared, did not act; she “lived” the film.\textsuperscript{143} Scriptwriter Sergei Ermolinsky, who found the beginning of the film pretentious, saw Natasha as a “fresh breeze.”\textsuperscript{144}

Despite this praise, others considered the film a failure. One prominent critic was Lev Anninsky, who thought Bondarchuk’s obsession with historical accuracy sapped the life from the film.\textsuperscript{145} Even more strongly, dissident director Sergei Paradzhanov argued that \textit{War and Peace} represented everything that was wrong with Soviet cinema; he saw it as indicative of an “amazing crisis” in the film industry.\textsuperscript{146} The highbrow journal \textit{Cinema Art (Iskusstvo kino)} was less direct in its attack. According to well-known director Georgy Daneliya, Bondarchuk and Solovev “chose the hardest but truest road. They tried to bring Tolstoy’s thoughts to the screen. . . . Directors don’t like to bring ideas to the screen for fear of boring the viewer . . . Bondarchuk wasn’t afraid of boring the viewer [emphasis added].”\textsuperscript{147}

The most scathing review came from Igor Zolotussky in the prominent literary journal \textit{New World (Novyi mir)}. Zolotussky argued that the film superficially reflected Tolstoy’s novel because only the book’s events (rather than the ideas) interested Bondarchuk. Zolotussky claimed that Bondarchuk’s \textit{War and Peace} was a “great spectacle,” but for Tolstoy, “war was not an epic.” For Bondarchuk, Zolotussky argued, “war is an epic without tragedy.”\textsuperscript{148} According to this critic, Bondarchuk had not captured the soul of the novel.\textsuperscript{149}
European reviews, in contrast, tended to be positive. A French review, for example, praised the film as “deeply individual, rich, and poetic”; French director Claude Autant-Lara admired Bondarchuk’s mastery of detail and thought the film transported the spectator into a richly nuanced world. One of Tolstoy’s grandchildren declared that it would have been “impossible to make it better.” British critic James Oldridge thought the picture captured the Russian soul (although he also thought the film could have been more dynamic to better suit contemporary tastes).

Because Bondarchuk’s War and Peace was directed in part toward the American audience as an answer to Vidor’s film, the American response is particularly interesting. Soviet films had done poorly at the US box office in the late 1950s and early 1960s, and Hollywood distributors left the US-Soviet film exchange in 1963; art film distributors contracted directly with Soveksportfilm. However, Bondarchuk’s film was dealt with differently. As film scholar Tino Balio writes: “The biggest deal was Walter Reade’s acquisition of Sergei Bondarchuk’s epic War and Peace, the most expensive film ever made up to that time. In 1968, Reade released a slightly cut and dubbed version of the film specifically to bypass the art house circuit.” Reade’s Continental Distributing paid $1.5 million for the rights and “spent the cost of a major film” on the dubbing and duplication of prints. The six-hour film opened on 28 April 1968 at the DeMille Theater in New York; it was shown in two parts, with a two and a half–hour intermission. The cost of a ticket for the benefit premiere was a colossal $125; ticket prices for the public ranged from $5.50 to $7.50, the highest ever for a film screened in the United States (the previous record was held by Funny Girl, at $6).
As in the USSR, the reaction to the film was mixed. Critics were united in lambasting the dubbing. Renata Adler of the *New York Times* wrote that the dubbing of such a long film may have been a feat, but it was also a terrible mistake: “It is that this particular movie, so quintessentially Russian, gains nothing by dubbing. It loses romance and authenticity.” Variety’s “Beau” felt that the dubbing detracted from the emotional scenes in the film. Stanley Kauffman, writing in the *New Republic*, noted that the dubbing had a “dead, studio quality.” Penelope Gilliatt in the *New Yorker* extensively bemoaned the decision to dub: “Dubbing a serious foreign picture is sometimes called ‘making it commercially viable.’ In the case of *War and Peace*, as usual, this turns out to be the gobbledygook phrase for letting sales chaps put a boot through it.” As far as the film itself was concerned, most American critics found it too long, especially the battle scenes. In the words of *Newsweek* critic Joseph Morgenstern, interest in the battle began “to pall after the 40,000th casualty.”

Although American reviewers had reservations about *War and Peace*, most of them thought the acting very good, especially Liudmila Saveleva as Natasha. *Time* admired the painterly grandeur of the film. “Mosk” in *Variety* wrote that “the costuming, sheer manpower, and the rattling din of violence overpower most critical reservations on this immense film.” Stanley Kauffman acknowledged that Bondarchuk “tried throughout to make a *film of War and Peace*, not merely a chronicle of the novel on film.” Although the reviews could have been better, there is no question that *War and Peace* had an impact both at home and abroad, demonstrating the might of Soviet cinema.
Was *War and Peace* then a victory in the cinematic Cold War? The USSR considered it so. Reviews aside, the film was seen by tens of millions, both at home and abroad, garnering the largest foreign audiences for any Soviet film. It won the coveted Oscar. It was highly praised in France, the center of European cinema. It became a cult classic in Japan. Today in Russia there has been a favorable reevaluation of the film, coinciding with its restoration and release on DVD by Ruscico. Might the resources of the state have been marshaled to stronger effect? It is hard to imagine a greater film based on Tolstoy’s masterpiece or one that better evokes the might and grandeur of Russia.

---


2 Kudriavtsev, *3500*, 185.


4 Iurii Tiurin, “*Voina i mir,*” in *Rossiiskii illuzion*, ed. L. M. Budiak, (Moscow: Materik, 2003), 417. This museum houses Franz Rubaud’s famous panorama, measuring 15 meters high and 115 meters long, that shows the French attack on the village of Semenovskoe. See Alexander Mikaberidze, *The Battle of Borodino: Napoleon against Kutuzov* (Barnsley, UK: Pen and Sword, 2007), 195. Mikaberidze renders the artist’s name “François Rubeau”; I have used the more common spelling.


8 Quoted in Stephen M. Norris, “Tolstoy’s Comrades: Sergei Bondarchuk’s *War and Peace* and the Origins of Brezhnev Culture,” in *Tolstoy on Screen*, ed. Lorna Fitzsimmons (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, forthcoming), ms. 1. My thanks to Professor Norris for letting me see his article in advance of publication.

9 Kristin Roth-Ey, *Moscow Prime Time*, 52.

10 Ibid., 30.


13 Solovev, “Voina i mir i my,” 122.


15 Bondarchuk resisted joining the Communist Party until 1970, when he decided that the lack of party membership would hurt his career.


18 Kudriavtsev, *3500*, 185. The figure of 120,000 is repeated in many sources; see, for example, “The Great Ones: *War and Peace,*” *Classic Film Collection 57* (Winter 1977):
18. The actual number of extras must be less than 20,000; the only concrete number we have is 15,000 soldier-extras in the Battle of Borodino.

19 Prokhorova, “War and Peace,” 181. According to Vystorobets, Sergei Bondarchuk, 121, the film was also shot in 35mm.

20 Kudriavtsev, 3500, 185.


22 Ibid., 134.


24 Viacheslav Ovchinnikov, “Interviews,” Voina i mir bonus disc.

25 Razzakov, Nashe liubimoe kino, 8. That translates to $260,000 (in 2013 dollars). The conversion factor is $8.69 (2013) to one ruble (1961). Furtseva was minister of culture from 1960 until her death in 1974.

26 Solovev, “Voina i mir i my,” 125.

27 Razzakov, Nashe liubimoe kino, 8.

28 Nina Tolchenova, Mera krasoty: Kino Sergeia Bondarchuka (Moscow: Sovetskaia Rossiia, 1974), 201.

29 Solovev, “Voina i mir i my,” 124, 126; Vystorobets, Sergei Bondarchuk, 110. The date of approval is alternatively given as 20 March; see Ministerstvo kultury Rossiiiskoi Federatsii, Nauchno issledovatelskii institut kinoiskusstva, Letopis rossiiskogo kino, 1946–1965 (Moscow: Kanon+, 2010), 546.

30 Vystorobets, Sergei Bondarchuk, 111.

31 Razzakov, Nashe liubimoe kino, 11; Vystorobets, Sergei Bondarchuk, 111.

32 Vystorobets, Sergei Bondarchuk, 112.


Other actors competing for Andrei were Yury Solomin, Eduard Martsevich, and Andrei Mikhalkov-Konchalovsky. See Natalia Tendora, *Viacheslav Tikhonov: Kniaz iz Pavlovskogo posada* (Moscow: Algoritm, 2008), 87; Viacheslav Ovchinnikov, “Interviews,” *Voina i mir* bonus disc.


Solovev, “*Voina i mir* i my,” 131.

Tendora, *Viacheslav Tikhonov*, 87.

Vasilii Lanovoi, “Interviews,” *Voina i mir* bonus disc.

Vasilii Lanovoi, “My znaem tsenu dobru,” in Palatnikova, *Sergei Bondarchuk*, 255–256. Bondarchuk eventually apologized to Lanovoi, who took over the part after Medvedev was fired. Nikita Mikhalkov was replaced after only one day’s work by Sergei Yermolov in the role of Petya; Nikolai Simonov was replaced as Kutuzov by Boris Zakhava, a director at the Vakhtangov Theater who had not acted in years, at the suggestion of the Ministry of Culture. See Razzakov, *Nashe liubimoe kinoe*, 17; Tendora, *Viacheslav Tikhonov*, 89; “*Voina i mir*: Kogda film proshel po ekranam,” *Iskusstvo kino* 1 (1968): 38.


Tikhonov, “Pozhaliute v kadr, kniaz!” 187–188.

Ibid., 190–191.
Ibid., 192–193. Bondarchuk supposedly wanted Yury Vlasov for Pierre, but he refused. Vystorobets, Sergei Bondarchuk, 119; Tendora, Viacheslav Tikhonov, 88. Innokenty Smokhtunovsky wrote: “The actor’s egoism of Bondarchuk won . . . and as it seems to me, War and Peace lost.” See Razzakov, Gibel sovetskogo kino, 481. Bondarchuk also cast his wife, Irina Skobtseva, as Pierre’s wife Hélène after Via Artman had already been hired for the role. See I. A. Musskii, Sto velikikh otechestvennykh kinofilmov (Moscow: Veche, 2006), 291. Both Bondarchuk and Skobtseva were at least fifteen years older than their characters, and it showed.


Razzakov, Nashe liubimoe kino, 18–19.

Ibid., 11–12; Tendora, Viacheslav Tikhonov, 88.

Solovev, “Voina i mir i my,” 129.


Ibid., 167–168.

Razzakov, Nashe liubimoe kino, 12.


Razzakov, Nashe liubimoe kino, 10.

Ibid., 19.

Ibid., 21–22.

Ibid., 219–220.

Bondarchuk, Zhelanie chuda, 132.

Vasilii Petritskii, “Interviews,” Voina i mir bonus disc.

Vystorobets, Sergei Bondarchuk, 117.

Ovchinnikov, “Interviews,” Voina i mir bonus disc.

Bondarchuk, Zhelanie chuda, 130.

Ovchinnikov, “Interviews,” Voina i mir bonus disc. Ovchinnikov went on to become an important Soviet composer.

Nikolai Ivanov, “Iz dnevnika direktora kartiny,” in Palatnikova, Sergei Bondarchuk, 144, 147.

Ibid., 151.

Ibid., 155, 157. Disapproval would have meant going back to the drawing board.

Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi arkhiv literatury i iskusstva (RGALI), f. 2453, op. 4, ed. khr. 239, Mosfilm, 1-oe Tvorecheskoe obedinenie, Stenogramma zasedaniia Khudozhestvenngo soveta ot 19 sentiabria 1961 g. po obsuzhdeniiu literaturnogo stsenariia S. F. Bondarchuka i V. Soloveva Voina i mir, pervaiia seriia, ll. 5, 14,18.

RGALI, f. 2453, op. 4, ed. khr. 239, l. 156. The decision about whether to divide the film into four parts was postponed until after the plan for three parts had been evaluated (ibid., l. 162).

Ivanov, “Iz dnevnika direktora kartiny,” 159.

Tendora, Viacheslav Tikhonov, 58.


Tendora, Viacheslav Tikhonov, 58.

76 Shabad, “‘War and Peace’ on Native Soil.”

77 Tendora, Viacheslav Tikhonov, 95. The number of soldiers’ uniforms claimed by Tendora does not jibe with the fact that 15,000 soldier-extras participated in the Battle of Borodino sequence.

78 Petritskii, “Interviews,” Voina i mir bonus disc.

79 Razzakov, Nashe liubimoe kino, 16–17.

80 Ivanov, “Iz dnevnika direktora kartiny,” 149.

81 Ibid., 148–149; Razzakov, Nashe liubimoe kino, 16.

82 Saveleva, “Bolno,” 178; The Making of a Film, Voina i mir bonus disc.

83 Razzakov, Nashe liubimoe kino, 19.

84 Petritskii, “Interviews,” Voina i mir bonus disc.


86 Petritskii, “Interviews,” Voina i mir bonus disc.

87 Razzakov, Nashe liubimoe kino, 23–24; Petritskii, “My na mnogoe smotreli po-raznomu,” 218.

88 The Making of a Film, Voina i mir bonus disc.

89 Petritskii, “Interviews,” Voina i mir bonus disc.

90 Razzakov, Nashe liubimoe kino, 23.

91 Petritskii, “Interviews,” Voina i mir bonus disc.


95 Petritskii, “My na mnogoe smotreli po-raznomu,” 218–219; Petritskii, “Interviews,” *Voina i mir* bonus disc. This was Petritsky’s second favorite scene, after the Battle of Borodino.

96 Razzakov, *Nashe liubimoe kino*, 29; Ivanov, “Iz dnevnika direktora kartiny,” 160; Petritskii, “My na mnogoe smotreli po-raznomu,” 220. Bondarchuk’s daughter confirms that his first words were about Gerasimov; see Natalia Bondarchuk, *Edinstvennye dni* (Moscow: Astrel, 2010), 161. Ivanov says that Bondarchuk collapsed from overwork the following fall, but this event was not as serious as the first heart attack.


100 RGALI, f. 3173, op. 1, ed. khr. 189, Stenogramma vstrechi presedatelia komiteta po kinematografii pri SM SSSR A.V. Romanova s uchastnikami vypusnikov stsenarnogo otdelenia kursov i stsenarnogo fakulteta VGIKa v Repino, 8–15 maia 1967 g., l. 20.

101 The publicity consisted mainly of photo spreads containing both stills and photos of the shooting.

102 Petritskii, “Interviews,” *Voina i mir* bonus disc.

103 Ivanov, “Iz dnevnika direktora kartiny,” 161.

104 Petritskii, “Interviews,” *Voina i mir* bonus disc.
Ivanov, “Iz dnevnika direktora kartiny,” 163; Razzakov, *Nashe liubimoe kino*, 34; Norris, “Tolstoy’s Comrades,” ms. 15. Razzakov gives the date as 17 October.

Impressive amounts of pyrotechnic material were required to obtain the necessary effects; see the list in Ivanov, 164.


Ivanov, “Iz dnevnika direktora kartiny,” 164.

RGALI, f. 3173, op. 1, ed. khr. 189, l. 20.

Ibid.

It was generally conceded that the multiple parts did not work. See Norris, “Tolstoy’s Comrades,” ms. 25.

Razzakov, *Nashe liubimoe kino*, 35–36. Examples of billed costs were the actors’ salaries, which were very modest. Bondarchuk received 20,100 rubles for playing Pierre (and 21,679 rubles as the director); Tikhonov, 22,228 rubles; and Saveleva, a pittance—10,685 rubles. In the words of Tendora, *Viacheslav Tikhonov*, 86: “If the film had been made in Hollywood, each actor taking part in it would have become millionaires.”

Kudriavtsev, *Svoe kino*, 413.

Shakhnazarov interview, *Voina i mir* bonus disc.


Tendora, *Viacheslav Tikhonov*, 92.
Shuranova was chagrined that some of her “snob-friends” claimed that “the American War and Peace is authentic. But ours—an illustration.” Shuranova, “On zhil Tolstym,” 241.

Ivanov, “Iz dnevnika direktora kartiny,” 164.

Tolchenova, Mera krasoty, 219.


Bondarchuk, Zhelanie chuda, 191. In an article Bondarchuk was writing for the journal Cinema Art (Iskusstvo kino), he was forced to change his use of “I” to “we.” See RGALI, f. 2962, op. 1, ed. khr. 90, Redaktsiia zhurnala Iskusstvo kino, Sergei Bondarchuk, “Khudozhnik dolzhen iskat,” ll. 16–17. This file has no date.

Trofimov, “Veroval!” 281. Trofimov, perhaps parroting Bondarchuk, wrote that although Tikhonov was a good actor, he had troubling maintaining a consistently noble affect (ibid.).

Shuranova, “On zhil Tolstym,” 244.


Ibid., 198.

Ibid., 199–200.

Tendora, Viacheslav Tikhonov, 86.

Tikhonov did not quit acting. He went on to become a People’s Artist (like Bondarchuk) in 1974, and in 1984 he was honored as a Hero of Socialist Labor (Gorelova, “Viacheslav Tikhonov,” 136). He also became a cult figure playing the role of Stirlitz in Tatiana Lioznova’s enormously popular television serial Seventeen Moments of Spring (Semnadtsat mgnovenii vesny, 1973).

131 Tendora, Viacheslav Tikhonov, 91–92.

132 RGALI, f. 3173, op. 1, ed. khr. 189, l. 20. Roth-Ey says there were more than 100 newspaper reviews; see Moscow Prime Time, 52, n.120.

133 Tendora, Viacheslav Tikhonov, 92. She notes that an American critic praised the sacking and burning of Moscow as “incomparable” and praised Natasha’s ball as “one of the most romantic moments in the history of the screen” (ibid., 85).

134 Ibid., 92. Tendora gives no reason for this.

135 Rostislav Iurenev, Iskusstvo, rozhdennoe oktiabrem (Moscow: Biuro propagandy Sovetskogo kinoiskusstva, 1968), 96. This well-placed Soviet film historian writes that there were complaints about Bondarchuk as Pierre, Tikhonov as Andrei, and Oleg Tabakov as Nikolai. But he compliments Saveleva and Ktorov and the battle scenes, the Moscow fire, and Natasha’s ball.


137 Tendora, Viacheslav Tikhonov, 94.


141 Tendora, *Viacheslav Tikhonov*, 91.

142 Ibid., 89; Musskii, *Sto velikikh otechestvennych kinofilmov*, 291.


145 Norris, “Tolstoy’s Comrades,” ms. 18–19.

146 Ibid., 25.

147 Georgii Daneliia, “Ne boias literaturu…,” *Iskusstvo kino* 9 (1965): 10. See also

Tendora, *Viacheslav Tikhonov*, 94.


149 Ibid., 280.


*Viacheslav Tikhonov*, 94.

151 Tendora, *Viacheslav Tikhonov*, 95.


154 Ibid.

155 Ibid., 220.

156 Ibid.

157 Ibid., 221.
Renata Adler, “War and Peace,” New York Times, 29 April 1968, 50. Adler thought the filmmakers were talented but “without genius.” She also complained that the money spent to make the film could have paid for a poverty program.


Stanley Kauffman, “Take a Giant Steppe,” New Republic, 18 May 1968, 24. Kauffman wrote that “the two-hour . . . break . . . was like a breather in an arduous unfinished job.”


Joseph Morgenstern, “The Biggest Movie,” Newsweek, 6 May 1968, 120. Morgenstern concluded that the film was “not bad.”


Balio, Foreign Film Renaissance, 221.

Mosk. “War and Peace—Part III. Variety, 10 May 1967, 6